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The Territorial Integrity of Iraq: Invocation, Violation, Viability 
 
Abstract 
This paper considers the ways in which Iraq‘s territorial integrity has been invoked by the 
international community, how it has been violated by the US-led coalition both before and since 
2003, and how these acts have called into question the future viability of the Iraqi state. The 
specific focus is on the first four years of the occupation. The paper contends that Iraq provides 
an instructive illustration of how the international legal term of territorial integrity is being pulled 
apart; where the spatial extent of the state must be preserved at all costs, yet the sovereignty of 
the state is rendered entirely contingent. Using interviews with key actors within the British 
context and documentary analysis, this paper examines the political situation in Iraq and the 
content of the new Iraqi constitution, the rise of factionalism within Iraq, and the report of the 
Iraq Study Group. In doing so it considers the impact of key decisions concerning Iraq‘s 
sovereignty upon the future viability of the state. 
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The Territorial Integrity of Iraq: Invocation, Violation, Viability 
 
Introduction 
Shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq was launched, Bush, Blair and Aznar hastily convened a 
summit in the Azores. In the joint statement that they gave at the end of the summit, they 
declared: 
 
We envisage a unified Iraq with its territorial integrity respected. All the Iraqi 
people – its rich mix of Sunni and Shiite, Arabs, Kurds, Turkomen, Assyrians, 
Chaldeans, and all others – should enjoy freedom, prosperity, and equality in a 
united country. We will support the Iraqi people‘s aspirations for a representative 
government that upholds human rights and the rule of law as cornerstones of 
democracy (Bush, Blair, Aznar, 2003) 
 
The use of the term ‗territorial integrity‘ is not isolated to this statement, but was repeatedly 
invoked before the invasion and has been a constant refrain since. In February 2003 Bush had 
declared that the US would ‗provide security against those who try to spread chaos, or settle 
scores, or threaten the territorial integrity of Iraq‘ (Bush, 2003). General Tommy Franks‘ briefing 
to his commanders in August 2002 stated that ‗the end state for this operation is regime change. 
Success is defined as regime leadership and power base destroyed; WMD capability destroyed or 
controlled; territorial integrity intact; ability to threaten neighbors eliminated; an acceptable 
provisional/permanent government in place‘ (quoted in Gordon and Trainor, 2006: 67). The 
declassified planning documents for the invasion (codenamed Polo Step), prepared by US 
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Central Command (CentCom) planners for Franks in 2002, bear this out. In Phase IV of the 
operation, scheduled to begin after combat operations ceased, the following objectives to support 
the establishment of a stable Iraqi government were set out: 
 
- Establish a secure environment and assist in recovery and reconstruction 
- Support the establishment of Iraqi Self-Defence forces 
- Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq 
- Transition civil/military activities to international organisations/ non-
governmental organisations/ Iraqi Government (CentCom, 2002) 
 
Douglas Feith presented the ‗US and Coalition Objectives‘ to Bush and the National Security 
Council on 4
th
 March 2003, and of these the key objective was that ‗Iraq‘s territorial integrity is 
maintained and the quality of life in Iraq is improved visibly‘ (Woodward, 2004: 328). Blair‘s 
key speech to the House of Commons on 18
th
 March 2003 during the debate on the war, called 
for a post-conflict UN resolution that would ‗protect totally the territorial integrity of Iraq‘ 
(Blair, 2003; see Cater, 2003; Keohane, 2005). This term of ‗territorial integrity‘ is the focus of 
this article. How are we to understand this term, and how and why has it been so mobilised in the 
context of the Iraqi state? (see also Elden, 2005; Williams and Roach, 2006; El Ouali, 2006) 
It would be instructive, in this general register, to broaden the inquiry beyond simply territorial 
integrity to look at the question of territory itself. While crucial to the question of state power, 
territory has received relatively little attention within political geography. By this we do not 
mean that there has not been extensive discussion of particular territorial arrangements, conflicts 
and settlements, but that the conceptual basis of the term has been under examined. While a 
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fuller discussion of the contemporary usage of this term, and its history are beyond the scope of 
this essay, it is worth raising a few issues. Territory is traditionally understood as a bounded 
space under the control or jurisdiction of a group of people, most commonly today a state. It is 
often blurred with understandings of territoriality – a strategy used by humans or groups of 
humans to command or organise a space. Yet the historical and geographical specificity of the 
term tends to be neglected in both of these literatures, and the basis for the crucial elements of 
‗space‘, ‗boundedness‘ and control are neglected.1 
It is clear from the statements of Bush, Blair and others, made as troops were massing on the 
Kuwaiti border and air strikes were being planned, that territorial integrity was understood to 
mean territorial preservation, by which we mean the maintenance of the existing borders and 
territorial settlement of Iraq and the region more generally. This was being stressed in part 
because of the concerns of Iraq‘s neighbours, but also because of a wish to contain the impact of 
the intervention, to simply effect regime change. There was a clear strategic need to reassure 
states in the region that whatever actions were committed by the coalition in Iraq they would not 
sanction, nor were they in any way meant to facilitate, the breaking up of Iraq into smaller states. 
Given the way in which ethnic and confessional identities do not straight-forwardly map onto 
territorial division, it was clear that this could lead to an increase in ethnic and religious 
instability throughout the region. Thus territorial integrity as territorial preservation was invoked 
specifically to assure Iraq‘s neighbours that the coalition wanted to keep Iraq as a single state and 
to maintain stability within the wider region. In February 2004, nearly a year after the invasion, 
all of Iraq‘s neighbours – Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Iran ‗declared their 
support for Iraq‘s territorial integrity‘ (McGoldrick, 2004: 174 n. 83). In interviews conducted 
during the winter of 2006-07,
2
 both the former Secretary of State for International Development, 
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Clare Short and the former UK Ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who were closely 
involved in the discussions of the British government in the lead up to war, agreed that when 
Iraq‘s territorial integrity was invoked in relation to Iraq that it was used only in connection with 
the territorial preservation of the state but not its sovereignty. Greenstock insisted that these were 
two separate things; Short that it was interlinked to wider concerns, and that the usage of term 
had to be understood in a wider context.
3
 
To see territorial integrity simply as territorial preservation is a partial sense of the term. 
Although it has a longer heritage, extending back into the early twentieth century and efforts of 
the international community to create and maintain a peaceable order, the key contemporary 
reference is the use of the term in the UN Charter (especially Article 2.4). There, as elsewhere, 
the UN‘s invocation of the term ‗territorial integrity‘ is partnered with a stress on sovereignty 
and political independence. One key instance of this was the crucial UN Security Council 
Resolution (SCR) 1441 on ‗the situation between Iraq and Kuwait‘ agreed on 8th November 2002 
(for a discussion see Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 112-3). With the situation becoming ever more 
tense in the region, this resolution sought to move towards an internationally agreed upon 
programme for the successful compliance of Iraq with existing resolutions concerning 
disarmament. Crucially it reaffirmed ‗the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Iraq, Kuwait and the neighbouring States‘ (UNSCR 1441). This was a 
key issue, repeated verbatim in the ‗second‘ resolution which the US and particularly the UK 
government attempted, unsuccessfully, to get agreed by the UN (see Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 
146-7; for the text see Sifry and Cerf, 2003: 499-500).
4
 Territorial integrity, in its use within the 
UN Charter, requires both territorial preservation and territorial sovereignty. Recent work in 
political geography and international relations has sought to question the contemporary 
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utilisation of the term, in order to highlight the problems inherent in its partial invocation (see 
Elden 2005, 2006; El Ouali, 2006; Williams and Roach, 2006). Many international lawyers 
would agree that territorial integrity requires not simply the maintenance of existing territorial 
settlements – what we here call ‗territorial preservation‘ – but equally the ability of a state, 
within its boundaries, to have domestic jurisdiction without intervention or prevention from 
outside – the notion of ‗territorial sovereignty‘ (see Akweenda, 1997; 1989; Zacher, 2001). 
Indeed, one of our interviewees stated that ‗the whole issue is how you define territorial 
integrity. Do you mean the unitary nature of the Iraqi state or do you mean the sovereignty of the 
Iraqi state?‘5 As Michael Byers argues, ‗interpreted according to the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, the ordinary meaning of Article 2(4) is clear: the use of force across borders 
is categorically prohibited‘ (Byers, 2005: 15). Yet this was palpably not how the term was 
understood by the Bush-Blair coalition in early 2003. We see the Azores Summit statement and 
associated pronouncements of the time as significant in showing how the US-led coalition 
repeatedly invoked Iraq‘s territorial integrity in a specifically partial sense. The blindness to this 
might be explained to some extent by Greenstock‘s suggestion that the meaning of territorial 
integrity in UN resolutions and associated discussions had attained the status of a ‗mantra‘, with 
the meaning of the term little discussed within the Security Council. He suggested that its 
inclusion in resolutions was meant to reassure people that the UN was not trying to challenge the 
existing tenets of international law that its resolutions were constructed upon.
6
  
While the arguments about the relationship between sovereignty and territorial integrity seem to 
us to be worth further pursuing, and not simply in relation to Iraq, one thing seems clear. This is 
that there has been a concerted argument in recent years against any absolute sense of territorial 
sovereignty, whether or not it is implied by territorial integrity. Greenstock, for instance, was 
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adamant that territorial integrity has no direct relation to sovereignty, yet he argued that the Iraqi 
state in 2003 had lost any sense of legitimacy and therefore any right to the sovereign control of 
its territory. This contingency has been explicitly stated by numerous US officials, including 
Stewart Patrick and Richard Haass of the State Department, and forms the basis of claims in the 
National Security Strategy and other policy documents. This is the idea that ‗sovereignty entails 
obligations‘. As the influential academic and government advisor Phillip Bobbitt has put it: 
 
The United States has argued that because sovereignty arises from the people, 
states that repudiate that popular basis – by denying democratic forms, or by 
practicing terror against their own populations – forfeit their claims of sovereignty 
and are therefore subject to lawful intervention by others. Both the Haitian and 
Panamanian interventions [and the NATO action in Yugoslavia over Kosovo] can 
be legitimated on this basis. Yet the texts of the U.N. Charter, numerous treaties, 
and U.N. resolutions explicitly proclaim the territorial integrity of states and their 
right of independence without qualification (2003: 648, the phrase in brackets is 
from the note on that page). 
 
Thus the legal basis of coalition claims is questionable, even if they make claims for legitimacy. 
The celebration of Iraqi territorial integrity is, at the same time, its evisceration. This problem 
has been accepted even by some of the advocates for war. As Richard Perle suggested, 
‗international law stood in the way of doing the right thing‘ (reported in Burkeman and Borger, 
2003; see Thornberry, 2005). Indeed, when told by the British Foreign Secretary that Foreign 
Office lawyers had doubts about the legality of military action, the US Secretary of State replied 
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that he should ‗get new lawyers‘. Yet this was not Iraq, 2003 and Jack Straw and Colin Powell, 
but Kosovo, 1999 and Robin Cook and Madeleine Albright (Albright, 2003: 384; see Mamdani, 
2005: 207). 
Kosovo demonstrates an important point here, with even some of those that disagreed with the 
Iraq war, such as Clare Short, agreeing with the general principle that sovereignty must have 
limitations, with Kosovo as the key example. Yet it seems to us that this raises much more 
general issues about the relation between ideas of humanitarian intervention—as outlined, for 
example, in the concept of the responsibility to protect (see International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001; United Nations, 2004)—and notions of contingent 
sovereignty. This demonstrates one of the internal logics of the post-Cold War era that the 
‗global war on terror‘ has brought into stark focus. We have seen, on the one hand, the absolute 
nature of territorial preservation; yet on the other, the entirely contingent nature of territorial 
sovereignty. While the latter gave rise to justifications for intervention in Iraq for a range of 
reasons concerning supposed pursuit of weapons of mass destruction; its putative links to 
terrorist organisations; and the undeniable treatment of its civilian population, the former has led 
to maintenance of the existing territorial settlement being the essential framework within which 
all debates concerning the future of Iraq and its people have been held. Perhaps most 
significantly, this has led to any questions of territory being rendered extra-constitutional in the 
constitutional negotiations.
7
 
 It is upon this question of territory that this paper focuses. We wish to argue that it is precisely 
because territorial integrity was invoked in such a specifically partial fashion that Iraq‘s 
territorial extent has been in question since the invasion of 2003. This is not to say that there 
were no challenges before, but rather to stress that the strategy of seeking to minimise them has, 
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somewhat paradoxically, meant that they have never been fully removed. This extends through 
the increased factionalism, which some have described as a ‗civil war‘, and the destabilising 
effects this is having on the wider region. What we wish to raise by this is a third meaning that 
territorial integrity implies, albeit more informally. This can especially be seen in terms of 
debates about the final status of the Palestinian territories and Kosovo. This is that territorial 
integrity also has a sense of viability. In other words, is Iraq as it currently exists sustainable? 
Would sub-state or secessionist regions be realistic self-contained sovereign units?  
In order to answer these questions in this paper we consider a number of issues analysing several 
elite accounts of the invasion and its aftermath, interviews with selected ‗experts‘, and numerous 
government speeches and official documents. This provides us with significant primary and 
secondary data with which to consider the extent to which Iraq‘s territorial integrity has been 
invoked and violated during the period from 2003-2007, and the effect that those actions may 
have on the future viability of the Iraqi state.  
 
A History of Iraq’s Territorial Integrity 
The complicated historical geographies of the Iraqi state have been carefully examined in a range 
of studies, and so need not detain us here (see for example The Geographer, 1964, 1970; Sluglett, 
1976; Tripp, 2007). The key issue is the role they play in determining the contemporary 
geographies of the Iraqi state. Dodge, for instance, contends that many of Iraq‘s present 
problems can be traced back to the period of the British Mandate and concerns surrounding the 
settlement of Iraq‘s boundaries.8 He argues that the mandate ideal was poorly suited to the region 
that became Iraq, with its strong tribal traditions and lack of experience of, or desire for, state 
institutions (Dodge, 2003). In addition, these tribal affiliations were, especially in the north, cut 
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across by the new international border. Thus, when Iraq gained full independence in 1932 a 
number of festering problems already existed, including the division of the Kurdish population 
between Iraq and Turkey.  
 
MAP HERE 
 
Throughout Iraq‘s history attempts have been made to keep the country together, both through 
force of arms and force of law. Iraq‘s various constitutions, for instance, have repeatedly stressed 
the inviolability of its territorial settlement, invoking its own territorial integrity. The 1990 
Constitution, for example, states in Article 3 that ‗the sovereignty of Iraq is an indivisible entity‘, 
and that ‗the territory of Iraq is an indivisible entity of which no part can be ceded‘. The 
importance of the territorial preservation of the state is underlined with its specific prohibition of 
secession. This is unsurprising given that, especially in the north, strong attachments to the tribal 
and ethnic distinctions of the three Ottoman vilayets (Mosul in the north and Basra in the south 
with Baghdad between) had been a continual issue for Iraqi governments. The issue of the 
viability of the Iraqi state has been a continuous undercurrent which, as we will discuss later, has 
re-emerged in recent years. 
This is particularly the case in terms of the Kurdish region in northern Iraq. Many Kurds argue 
that this region is a part of a greater Kurdistan, comprising Kurdish populations in neighbouring 
Iran, Turkey and Syria and that the boundary delimitation treaties of the 1920s artificially 
divided the Kurdish homelands. Since 1991 the Kurdish region in Iraq has been operating under 
de facto autonomy (see Stansfield, 2003a, 2003b). Following the defeat of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf 
War, Saddam forcibly put down uprisings in the north and south of the country. A huge 
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movement of Iraq Kurds toward the Turkish border, attempting to escape the Ba'athist regime, 
led to Turkey formally closing its border with Iraq leaving thousands stranded in the 
mountainous border country inside northern Iraq (Laizer, 1996). The UNSC responded by 
passing resolution 688 on 3
rd
 April 1991, in which it called on Iraq to allow immediate access to 
these people by international humanitarian organisations. The US and UK governments used this 
as a basis for establishing and policing no-fly zones in the north and south of the country (see 
Williams 2007).  
Some commentators, such as Ahmed (2003: 194-7) have challenged the claim that the no-fly 
zones served a humanitarian purpose, on the somewhat tendentious grounds that the people were 
persecuted elsewhere and that a more genuine desire to protect the civilian population would 
have been a more widespread measure. Ahmed also notes that the Turks were able to cross into 
the north in their war with the PKK, and that the protection in the south prevented little due to 
most of the persecution being through artillery or army. His claim is that these had more to do 
with strategic interests. The impact of the sanctions regime undoubtedly caused many Iraqi 
deaths, and it is often forgotten that the ‗policing‘ of the no-fly zones caused causalities itself. 
One other aspect that is worth noting is that these measures had absolutely no basis in UNSC 
resolutions. John Pilger notes an interview with the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali 
who stated with regard to the framing of resolution 688 that ‗the issue of no-fly zones was not 
raised and therefore not debated: not a word… they offer no legitimacy to countries sending their 
aircraft to attack Iraq‘ (Pilger, 2002; see Fisk, 2006: 885). Yet this resolution unquestionably 
stressed the commitment of the UN to respecting the ‗sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence‘ of Iraq.  
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Much has been written on the efficacy and ethics of these zones (see McKelvey, 1997; Tart, 
2001; Yamashita, 2004; Benard, 2004). In terms of Iraq‘s territorial integrity they clearly 
inhibited the ability of the Iraqi government to exercise its sovereign powers across the full 
extent of its territory. This points towards understanding Iraq‘s sovereignty, and therefore its 
territorial integrity more widely, as being contingent: dependent on its actions and policed by the 
US and UK.  
This compromised sovereignty was further eroded in 1998 when the allies launched Operation 
Desert Fox. This operation, which involved the US launching a number of cruise missile and 
bombing attacks upon sites within Iraq, was carried out as a result of Iraq‘s perceived failure to 
adhere to the requirements of UN Security Council Resolutions and to comply with the UN 
weapons inspectors. With its stated remit to uphold UN directives, this attack met with relatively 
little resistance from the international community, though this clearly reinforced the continued 
erosion of Iraq‘s territorial sovereignty. 
Thus while these resolutions did not de jure dismember Iraq, they profoundly limited the ability 
of Iraq to exercise its sovereignty across its entire territorial extent.
9
 This is both in terms of the 
limits on its projection of military power within its own boundaries – what Liberal Democrat 
Foreign Affairs spokesman Michael Moore raised in terms of the vertical dimension of territorial 
integrity
10
 – but also in terms of the humanitarian agencies which were able to exercise the 
sovereign power over the lives of the inhabitants (see Duffield 2007). The governance of life 
itself thus moved from Iraq to these agencies, and in this, along with other registers Iraq‘s 
territorial sovereignty was compromised. De facto, its territorial preservation was also affected. 
With the inability of Saddam‘s forces to exercise power, the Kurdish region in northern Iraq 
functioned, during the 1990s, as effectively autonomous, under the control of the democratically 
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elected Kurdish Regional Government (Natali, 2005: 64). However, two rival factions - the PUK 
and the KDP- ensured that this self-rule was not ever fully delivered. In 1994 civil war broke out 
between these two parties and the region was effectively divided into two sections, each under 
the control of one faction (Stansfield 2003b). This division continued throughout the 1990s, and 
the region's autonomy was further eroded by the invitation in of Iraqi forces to quell some of the 
civil conflict. 
 
Political Process and Constitution 
As well as being a frame within which the invasion of Iraq was conceived, the invocation of 
territorial integrity also functioned to contain the occupation and reconstitution of the state 
within established boundaries, directly linking the sovereignty of Iraq to a preconceived 
geographical entity. Indeed, as Anderson and Stansfield point out succinctly, ‗Iraq has 
maintained its territorial integrity as a state. What it has never succeeded in becoming is a nation‘ 
(2004: 6).  The ‗state‘ in this instance implies the legal basis, while the ‗nation‘ suggests a less 
rigid sense of a shared community. Yet these notions are not necessarily entirely in tension. The 
Iraqi Ambassador to the UK, Dr Salah al Shaikly, highlighted this phenomenon when he noted 
that the Iraqi National Accord, of which he was a member when it planned for the future of Iraq 
after the overthrow of Saddam, had also focused upon the preservation of the territorial state of 
Iraq, rather than addressing or opening up the national identities of its constituent population. He 
commented that: ‗At no time in fact, at no time, then or now or ever, [had we] ever thought that 
Iraq would be more than one country‘.11  On the one hand this stops short of a project of nation-
building, yet on the other it demonstrates that elite Iraqis did consider their country to be a 
single, unified, geographically fixed, state. Thus, for the Iraqi opposition it was a case of 
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replacing the existing regime with a new one, within a given, largely unproblematised, territorial 
frame.  
The nature of that change (driven by Iraqis) would have given a strength to its claims for 
legitimacy; something that the coalition was unwilling to immediately entertain. In May 2003 the 
UK and US Ambassadors to the UN published a joint statement in which they described the way 
the Coalition Provisional Authority would operate as the sovereign power:  
 
The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners working through 
the Coalition Provisional Authority shall, inter alia, provide for security in and the 
provisional administration of Iraq. Including by: deterring hostilities; maintaining 
the territorial integrity of Iraq and securing Iraq‘s borders (Greenstock & 
Negroponte, 2003; see Chesterman, 2004: 93). 
 
What is telling about this programme is the way that it explicitly puts security first, seeing the 
administration of the state as subsequent to it. Many would agree with this ordering, although it 
was obviously much less effective in practice. Yet one of the reasons why security has been so 
difficult to obtain may be precisely because of this obsession with a particular framing. As 
O‘Leary and Salih comment, ‗the CPA was fixated on its public international commitment to the 
territorial integrity of Iraq which pushed it toward favouring a recentralised Iraq‘ despite the 
particular opposition of the Kurds (2005: 32). This focus can be further evidenced on the CPA‘s 
own record of its achievements. In setting out what it saw as the main objectives of Iraq‘s new 
foreign policy they stated that it must be to ‗protect Iraq‘s security, stabilise the country and 
preserve Iraq‘s territorial integrity‘ (CPA, 2004: 46) 
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Just as with the invasion plans, it is clear that territorial integrity here is understood as territorial 
preservation. It must be so, since sovereignty over Iraq was held, at least temporarily, by an 
occupying force. Greenstock, who held a role in the CPA as British Special Representative, 
conceded that the coalition occupation was ‗in effect a suspension of [Iraq‘s] sovereignty‘, but 
argued that this ‗didn‘t affect the territorial integrity‘ because while it ‗affected the sovereignty 
of [the] government… it didn‘t affect the sovereignty of the state and its people‘12 On these 
terms sovereignty was held in abeyance, ready to be returned when a suitable Iraqi 
administration could be put in place. 
The peculiar performance of sovereignty that entailed the handover of power from the CPA to 
the transitional government has been discussed elsewhere, so we will focus here only on the 
territorial aspects. This stress on territorial preservation can be clearly illustrated through 
reference to the new Iraqi constitution. There is a clear tension inherent in this document. On the 
one hand it sought to play off competing demands along ethnic divisions, as power given in one 
direction had to be balanced with compromises in another; on the other it continually stressed the 
shared nature of the struggles and future challenges for an Iraqi state it was in the process of 
constituting and reconstituting. Article 65, for example, states that the President shall be seen as 
‗the symbol of the nation‘s unity and represents the sovereignty of the country‘. They are further 
charged with guaranteeing adherence to the constitution as well as ‗the preservation of Iraq‘s 
independence and unity and the security of its territory, in accordance to the law‘. Further, 
Article 107 states that the role of the central federal authority will be to ‗maintain the unity of 
Iraq, its integrity, independence, sovereignty and its democratic system‘ (Iraq Constitution, 
2005).  
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At the same time however, the new Iraqi constitution itself creates a number of difficulties 
concerning the future territorial integrity of Iraq. This occurs most obviously with regard to the 
wrangling over the form that the Iraqi state should take, the extent to which it is federated or 
decentralised, and the place of the different groupings within the organs of the state. The 
constitution provides a great deal of latitude in terms of the potential decentralisation of the state. 
Article 113 clearly states that Iraq shall be a federal state ‗made up of the capital, regions, 
decentralised provinces, and local administrations‘. Yet the continued deferring of the most 
difficult decisions concerning the federal nature of the new state threatens to challenge this. By 
devolving substantial powers to the regions, especially the Kurdish north, the constitution strikes 
an uneasy balance between attempting to maintain Iraq as a territorial whole, whilst aiming to 
give enough power to the regions to prevent secession. Thus the Iraqi constitution is still viewed 
as a document in transition, not yet a finished product. While leaving room for manoeuvre is an 
understandable tactic, this goes beyond this. Most crucially it means that the key questions of 
what Iraq is, both in terms of its people and its territorial extent, remain open. The Constitution 
of Iraq fails to address the very real question of the constitution of—that is the elements which 
make up—Iraq. As Ambassador al Shaikly noted, it is impossible to write a constitution quickly, 
as it needs reflection, and it ‗has to come out of the experience of the nation‘. He suggested that 
the environment was not right, as ‗it was very enflamed and violent when the constitution was 
written‘.13 Despite it being voted for, many believe it needs to be looked at again.14 
In terms of the international community there have been similar issues. Rather than the earlier 
invocation of the ‗sovereignty and territorial integrity‘ of Iraq, UNSCR 1546, passed on 8th June 
2004, stressed the ‗independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Iraq‘, noting the 
framework of the international system that post-2003 Iraq must operate within. Thus sovereignty 
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is reinforced with independence, and territorial integrity linked to the idea of unity. These types 
of pronouncements serve again to centre the notion of territorial integrity, at once 
unproblematically and yet equally to stress tacitly the way in which it has been understood, and 
violated.  
 
Viability 
Immediately after the 1991 Gulf War, a White House policy paper declared that ‗in no way 
should we associate ourselves with the 60-year-old rebellion in Iraq or oppose Iraq‘s legitimate 
attempts to suppress it‘ (quoted in Kaplan and Kristol, 2003: 41, emphasis added). We find here 
an interesting stress on the territorial sovereignty of Iraq, that matters of internal concern are for 
Iraq alone. The justification for this war had been the invasion of Kuwait, legally coded as Iraq‘s 
violation of Kuwait‘s territorial sovereignty, and the limits of intervention had been to redress 
that wrong, rather than to overthrow the Saddam regime. Although this had been with UN 
authorisation, the first President Bush‘s National Security Advisor has claimed this was not 
essential. 
 
While we had sought United Nations support from the outset of the crisis, it had 
been as part of our efforts to forge an international consensus, not because we 
thought we required its mandate. The UN provided an added cloak of political 
cover. Never did we think that without its blessing we could not or would not 
intervene (Scowcroft in Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 416). 
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Colin Powell, who had served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1991 war, similarly 
justified the way in which the military action did not continue to Baghdad, suggesting that ‗it 
would not contribute to the stability we want in the Middle East to have Iraq fragmented into 
separate Sunni, Shia, and Kurd political entities‘ (Powell, 1995: 512). The reasons behind this 
are clearly outlined by McQueen: 
 
Although the US would have liked to see Saddam Hussein removed from power, 
perhaps through a military coup d’état, it did not intend the disintegration of Iraq 
for a number of reasons. It believed that the ‗Lebanonisation of Iraq‘ would 
‗create a geopolitical nightmare‘ that might significantly destabilise the balance of 
power in the region. The US feared the rising influence of Iranian fundamentalism 
in the Middle East, as did its allies Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which were more 
concerned about Shi‘ite domination of Iraq than about the continuation of a 
weakened Ba‘athist regime. In addition, the US feared that the disintegration of 
Iraq into its ethnically homogenous parts might risk a power vacuum that would 
lead to instability and recurrent warfare in the region (2005: 31). 
 
A number of these concerns clearly relate to the situation the US, UK, and Iraq have found 
themselves since 2003. Indeed, as Galbraith notes,  
 
ironically, it was Bush [Senior‘s] failure to help the uprising that produced the 
breakup of Iraq. The Kurds created their de facto independent state when the 
president was forced to establish the safe haven for them. America‘s indifference 
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to the slaughter of Iraq‘s Shiites drove them into the embrace of Iran‘ (Galbraith, 
2006: 60)  
 
Yet during the Clinton years, the long running problems and the regrets of some who had 
previously advocated caution, as well as the increasingly influence of those who had wanted to 
overthrow Saddam then, led to a sustained call for a resolution of the situation. By the time 
George W. Bush was elected, and especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11
th
 2001, 
there was great momentum behind calls for intervention. What is interesting is that reasons 
previously given about instability were no longer sufficient of a present danger to mitigate 
against intervention. In 2003 the neoconservatives Kaplan and Kristol, for example, declared that 
 
We have long ago passed the threshold where the prospect of, say, a fragmented 
Iraq is a greater evil than the persistence of Saddam Hussein. That things might be 
worse without him is of course a possibility. But given the status quo in Iraq, it is 
difficult to imagine how (2003: 96).  
 
Five years later, it is unfortunately all too obvious. Despite a number of events which have been 
hailed as important milestones – the end of ‗major combat operations‘ (1st May 2003); the 
transfer of sovereignty from Bremer to unelected Iraqi officials (28
th
 June 2004); the acceptance 
of the constitution in a referendum (15
th
 October 2005) and various elections – increased and 
sustained violence, ethnic divisions and political gridlock rendered this state almost untenable as 
a viable political entity. Yet there would be very real problems for any sub-state entity seeking to 
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break away from Iraq. These include issues concerning the contiguity of territory within a state 
and its ability to function self-sufficiently.  
Several issues, such as passage to the outside world, access to resources, the free movement of 
people and goods and control of airspace and territorial waters are crucial to full sovereignty. 
The continuing issues facing Palestine and Israel, and the viability of a two-state solution there, 
illustrate this point succinctly (see Farsakh, 2001). With specific relation to Iraq, questions of 
ethnic divisions, access to the sea, oil reserves, fertile land and the location of marshes, 
mountains and deserts all raise a number of complications. For instance, Iraq‘s vast deposits of 
oil are located in two relatively small geographic areas within the state. Therefore, it is 
unsurprising that some Iraqis are opposed to any fragmentation of Iraq, seeing this as a potential 
for dispossession, whilst others living within these resource-rich regions are less concerned about 
Iraq‘s future construction, and indeed at times are expressly pushing for its breakup. Such 
strategic considerations help to explain some of the tactics of those holding positions of power 
within post-2003 governments. 
Arguments about these sorts of problems are not new. In 2004 Michael Knights of The 
Washington Institute suggested that 
 
Current trends suggest that it will be governed by a very strong form of 
federalism, with central government playing a minimal role. With the traditional 
central government role of security devolved to the regions, Iraq‘s oil revenues 
could become the only real element of the Iraqi state holding the nation together – 
the only feature with sufficient gravity to stop the centrifugal forces of 
sectarianism from pulling the country apart (2004: 238). 
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Others have worried about the possibilities that this might produce. As a Professor of Strategic 
Studies at the U.S. Naval War College has noted, reporting the views of a Kurd interlocutor, ‗the 
US will fight for the last seat on the last helicopter; the Kurds will go up into the mountains and 
―those who remain behind to fight over the rotting carcass of the Iraqi state will be the survivors 
of a process of political Darwinism‖‘ (Hashim, 2006: 361). In his study of the insurgency in the 
country, Hashim suggests two alternatives of a soft partition of confederation ‗with ironclad 
agreements on territorial boundaries and resource-sharing‘, or a ‗―hard partition‖, which splits 
the country into distinct and independent entities‘. He goes on to suggest that ‗the mere mention 
of partition is viewed with distaste by the international community, genuine horror regionally, 
and wide variety of responses by Iraqis‘. His conclusion is that ‗it would be best if the Iraqis 
were to walk back from the abyss and find a way to coexist‘ (Hashim, 2006: 360). While this 
may be true in terms of the impact the current situation is having, very real questions need to be 
asked about whether this is in the genuine long term interest of the people. 
In 2006, then British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett was asked what sort of Iraq Britain 
would leave, she replied: ‗one that was democratic, which could ―cope‖ and that was ―back on its 
feet‖‘. She was further questioned about whether she thought Iraq was sustainable or might 
fragment. Her reply was instructive: ‗Everyone has been very keen to keep everyone together but 
in the longer term... it is not for us to say ‗you will do this or you will do that‘.‘ Her interviewer 
then asked if it would be a disaster to have this fragmented state: ‗If that is what they want and 
they feel it is workable that is another matter‘ (BBC News 2006a). It is of course difficult to 
argue with the claim that it is for the Iraqi people to decide.
15
 However two key points need to be 
made to nuance this argument: one is the question of who the Iraqi people are. Does it is include 
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those currently present within the legal boundaries of the country, or those who are currently 
living elsewhere? Where do those who lived in exile during the Saddam regime, those who 
formed the Iraqi National Accord and other key voices of dissent, fit into this picture? What 
about those who have begun to return to Iraq since the overthrow of the former regime? This is 
particularly important when the question of regions or key cities are discussed. Kirkuk, for 
instance, witnessed significant population changes as a result of Ba‘athist policies, so any 
plebiscite on its future regional affiliation is necessarily problematic. It would be problematic 
both in terms of political viability but also, and potentially more importantly, by reducing a 
political problem to a question of a technocratic, calculative solution. The continuation of census 
practices also invokes another register in which, as Derek Gregory has put it (2004), we live in 
the ‗colonial present‘. Another key issue is how the insistence on Iraqi choice fits with the deeply 
compromised sovereignty of the existing government, constitution and population, all the time 
the country continues to be occupied by US and UK forces? 
 
Factionalism in Iraq  
One of the issues that is often under examined is how the continual attempt to balance the 
competing interests of ‗Kurds, Shi‘as and Sunnis‘ has not brought them closer together as Iraqis, 
but rather helped to cement them as discrete identities. This was a point made many times by our 
interviewees. In his book on the Bosnian conflict, Campbell, following Derrida, utilises the 
notion of ontopology, linking ‗territorial representation, population identification, and historical 
determination‘ to examine the roots and outcomes of the collapse of Yugoslavia (1998: 80). 
Adopting this approach gives a powerful lens with which to analyse the impact of invocations 
and violations of territorial integrity in the current factionalism within Iraq because it allows us 
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to consider the extent to which these problems are rooted in historically-grounded divisions that 
link Iraqi notions of ‗home‘ to either a specific ethnic or religious group, or to a bounded 
territorial entity (see Bulley, 2006). These notions have become increasingly important since the 
2003 invasion, not only as a rallying point against the US-led coalition, but also as self-
identifiers utilised to heighten the significance of the different minorities, and the differences 
between them. 
The militant factionalism within Iraq has all too often seen as the basis for the descent into what 
the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, and former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi have 
both called a ‗civil war‘ (see BBC News, 2006b; Cockburn, 2006: 208).16 The emergence of 
groups such as the Mehdi Army, and the growth in obviously sectarian-motivated attacks in Iraq, 
clearly have ethnic and religious bases. Yet rendering them as purely ethnic conflicts fails to 
illuminate the complex nature of the post-2003 situation and does nothing to generate an 
understanding of its origins. The Western media has been all too happy to paint this infighting as 
symptomatic of a country dogged by divisions that can be traced back to its inception as a state 
(see Packer, 2006: 336). However, this over-simplification overlooks the composition of pre-
2003 Iraq and fails to analyse how events since then have shaped and embedded new 
factionalisms across the country. Indeed, Ambassador Al Shaikly suggested that under Saddam 
there was a strong sense of an Iraqi identity: 
 
We have never quarrelled among ourselves since the British put together modern-
day Iraq in the ‘20s. Iraqis didn‘t quarrel among themselves. In other words, 
Arabs didn‘t fight Kurds; Shi‘a didn‘t fight Sunnis. Our quarrel was not lateral, 
our quarrel was vertical in a sense. We quarrelled with our government all the 
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time. We accused them of being dictators, we accused them of not giving us 
sufficient freedom. But we haven‘t quarrelled with each other.17 
 
As Packer similarly suggests, ‗the decades of living together wove innumerable personal ties and 
created a national consciousness that was badly damaged by Saddam, especially among the 
young, but was nonetheless real‘ (Packer, 2006: 337). Yet, of course, as al Shaikly himself 
admitted, the situation is different today. It is too simplistic to argue that the presence of coalition 
forces in Iraq and the overthrow of the Saddam regime are completely to blame for this emergent 
factionalism, yet the handling of the reconstruction and occupation has undoubtedly played a 
major role.
18
 As Packer continues, ‗there was nothing inevitable about Iraq‘s falling apart. If it 
fell apart, it would do so because of the folly of its leaders‘ (Packer, 2006: 337). The violence in 
the country is not confined to one of the stated groups, and some of the worst Iraqi-on-Iraqi 
violence has come from the Shi‘a community that, according to received wisdom, has benefited 
most from the removal of the pro-Sunni Saddam regime. Instead we need to consider the extent 
to which the rise in factionalism was itself produced through the attempts to operate within a 
fixed sense of the territorial extent and the population composition of the country. 
As al Shaikly‘s comments above suggest, the history of Iraq is not, as many would suggest, 
straight-forwardly shot through with inter-ethnic animosities. To be sure, as in all multi-ethnic 
and multi-religious states, a degree of tension has been present but political movements within 
Iraq have often tended to focus more explicitly upon the removal of the incumbent regime rather 
than changing its ethnic composition. The question, therefore, arises as to what has happened in 
Iraq to change this vertical quarrel into a lateral one.  
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To consider post-2003 factionalism in Iraq as simply a conflict between Shi‘a, Sunni, and Kurd, 
is to grossly simplify a complex situation. Inevitably though, as the Shi‘a, Sunni, and Kurd are 
the three most populous groupings it is the actions from within these groups that receive the most 
coverage. Second, these are not discreet groups. As well as intermarriage which inevitably 
complicates straightforward division – al Shaikly claimed that ‗50% of the Iraqi population are 
of mixed nationality‘19 – the majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims. Third, popular conceptions of 
Iraq commonly suggest that these three groupings are based in discreet geographical localities 
whilst in reality this is only significantly true for the Kurds.
20
  
As noted above, the Kurdish population within Iraq is concentrated in the north of the country, 
although there are significant elements of other population groups in this area. Yet events have 
conspired to keep the Kurds concentrated within this geographical area, and their relationship to 
the Iraqi state was altered inexorably by the imposition, by the US and UK, of the northern no-
fly zone after the 1991 Gulf War, which effectively limited Iraq‘s ability to enforce and maintain 
its territorial integrity and allowed the Kurds to operate de facto autonomy over the region. Since 
2003, however, the Kurdish situation has become increasingly complex with prominent Kurds 
explicitly advocating Iraq‘s territorial integrity through their participation in the CPA and the 
new Iraqi government. Indeed the current President of Iraq is Jalal Talabani, former leader of one 
of the Kurdish factions, whilst his bitter enemy during the 1990s, Massoud Barzani, presently 
holds the position of President of the Kurdish autonomous government. Both these men have 
stated that they do not wish to see Iraq split into its original three provinces, but instead favour 
the development of a federal Iraq (BBC News, 2005a; BBC News, 2005b). In terms of calls for 
full Kurdish independence this is a step backwards. It remains unclear, however, whether these 
are their true strategies, or that they are merely tactically sensible actions given the current 
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climate and in particular the US occupation. However, as Bremer notes, in the early stages of the 
post-Saddam period Talabani commented that ‗you are asking us to join an Iraq in which we‘ll 
have less freedom that we had while Saddam was in power‘ (2006: 297, emphasis added). 
Indeed, as Packer notes, ‗a generation of Kurds grew up speaking no Arabic and feeling no 
connection to Iraq, and the idea of rejoining a country that not long ago visited genocide and 
ethnic cleansing on Kurds was a hard sell‘ (2006: 362).  
These comments reinforce a perception that Iraqi Kurdistan is territorially and culturally separate 
from the rest of Iraq, and that its potential bond with Kurds in neighbouring countries is greater 
than its attachment to the rest of Iraq. However, whether Kurds want independence is not clear 
cut. Oxford Research International polls, in 2005, found that only 12% of Kurds polled were in 
favour of Iraq being broken up into separate states (see Dodge, 2005: 55). Yet during the January 
2005 elections there were unofficial ‗referendum booths just outside, or actually inside, every 
polling place. Two million Kurds voted in the referendum and 98 percent chose independence‘ 
(Galbraith, 2006: 171). In addition, while there is little argument that the Kurdish population 
within Iraq does have a distinct territorial extent, and has experience of controlling its own 
sovereign functions that would allow the creation of a separate state, such geographical readings 
of the other factional disputes within Iraq are less clear cut.  
Much of the post-2003 coverage of the rise of factionalism in Iraq has centred upon the supposed 
conflict between the Shi‘a and Sunni Arabs, and of the Sunni ‗insurgency‘ against the coalition 
(on the occupation and insurgency see McCarthy, 2006; Napoleoni, 2005). Much of this has 
focused upon the perceived geographical heart of the rebellion against the coalition and the new 
government – the ‗Sunni Triangle‘. This region, which has Baghdad at its eastern corner, and 
Ramadi to the west and Tikrit to the north, has been consistently held up as the seat of the 
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insurgency
21
, but as Packer comments this term is seen by many within Iraq as an ‗insult – that 
the term was an American invention‘ (2006: 335-6). A particular geographical imaginary is at 
play here, suggesting that specific areas, and sites within them – Fallujah being the most obvious 
example – can be targeted as part of the process of securitising Iraq. 
In his study of Bosnia Campbell talks about the ways in which ‗questions of history‘ can be 
‗violently deployed in the present for contemporary political goals‘ (1998: 86). This has certainly 
been seen in terms of Iraq‘s present. The coalition‘s invocation of Iraq‘s territorial integrity as 
preservation, and in particular the strategy of bargaining with the perceived key ethnic 
groupings, actually helped bring the artificial nature of the Iraqi state to the fore. Rather crudely 
it suggested that Iraq was composed of three largely homogenous groups the Shi‘a, Sunni, and 
Kurd, who populated almost exclusively three distinct geographical regions, mapping on to the 
original Ottoman vilayets of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. The strength of a defined Iraqi 
Kurdistan and the emergence of more notional entities, such as the Sunni triangle, play into these 
arguments, as the geographies of the pre-Iraqi populations within the Ottoman Empire are 
unproblematically mapped onto today‘s factionalism. This is yet another partial invocation, a 
partial understanding of Iraq‘s current problems and the crises they create for its continued 
territorial viability.  
At the heart of sovereignty is the ability to secure the state, protect the population and to enforce 
security within its borders. While many states are not able to achieve this, it is the inherent myth 
that founds the international system; what Greenstock described as ‗an important structural 
fiction‘.22 The failings of the CPA and the legacies of the occupation are, of course, multiple, but 
the lack of an accountable sovereign and the failure to provide security and basic services 
undoubtedly led to a breakdown in trust. For some, this is productive of division rather than a 
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consequence of it. Greenstock admitted failures of the CPA, and talked at length about the ways 
in which security and identity are linked 
 
You can take risks in sharing territory and life and towns and shops and modes of 
transport with people of other identities, if you trust the rule of law and you trust 
the central government to provide services including security within which those 
different identities can live without harming each other. If you take the security 
away, you take those government services away, and move into the politics of 
insecurity. Then people of a particular identity are suspicious of any people of any 
other identity in case they are a danger to them, and when insecurity becomes 
almost total in your daily life and in your perceptions of your society the most 
dangerous people to you are those who are geographically closest to you of a 
different identity.
23
 
 
This can clearly be seen in what has happened in Baghdad, but also in other parts of the country. 
As two of our interviewees noted, the parallels with Hobbes are striking.
24
 While the situation 
has undeniably been exploited by those opposed to the US for other reasons, and by those who 
seek to use this as an opportunity to settle scores, there is a root problem which stems from the 
actions of the CPA and its successors. There are undoubtedly parallels to Bosnia, as these events 
reinforce the notion that representations of history, identity, and space are intrinsically linked in 
the production of conflict. While al Shaikly suggested to us that these problems were in part the 
obsession of Western journalists and academics,
25
 it seems more plausible that they were 
exacerbated by the outcome of the occupation. That they exist today is, it seems, undeniable. As 
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Simon Jenkins suggested, ‗there is no self-delusion to which an Iraqi will not be subject if he 
really wants to… To say we caused it, fine. To say that we are now talking it up, just flies in the 
face of reality‘.26  
In addition, such representations are not bounded by the territorial limits of states; the 
implications of the assault on Iraq having sent significant ripples across the wider Middle East 
and beyond. Indeed, one of the few things all of our interviewees agreed upon was that only by 
addressing the place of Iraq within the wider region and allying its security and prosperity to that 
of its neighbours could any lasting progress be made.
27
 To this end, gestures towards a regional 
security conference for the Middle East have been recently made.
28
 At such a conference Iraq‘s 
territorial integrity would no doubt be addressed. For the coalition and elements within the 
government there is a pressing need to remove the influence of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria 
from the internal politics of the country (see Samii, 2003). Yet such aspirations will ring hollow 
while the US and UK continue to occupy it, even if we believe the claim that this is merely at the 
request of the Iraqi government.
29
 As Bremer recounts, in the 2004 handover Bush expressed a 
clear view about the new Iraqi Prime Minister: 
 
whoever it is, I want to be sure that he won‘t start playing to the gallery by 
attacking the Coalition right after taking office… we‘ve got to be certain the new 
PM won‘t ask us to leave the day after sovereignty (Bremer, 2006: 360) 
 
The Iraq Study Group and the Troop Surge 
The stability of the Middle East as a whole was a key theme in the recently published report of 
the Iraq Study Group. They suggest that ‗no country in the region will benefit in the long term 
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from a chaotic Iraq‘ (2006: ix, see 27); yet the key issue here is the ‗in the long term‘. Actually, 
for a number of neighbours, Syria and Iran among them, having the US bogged down in Iraq 
substantially lessens the chance of a US military intervention in their own affairs.
30
 Equally a 
pro-US regime with US bases and preferential oil deals would hardly be in their own interest (see 
Hashim, 2006: 136-7). Yet even in the long term these countries interests do not simply coincide. 
Saudi Arabia has reportedly stated that if the US withdraws they will consider arming Sunni 
militias in order to protect them from Shiite forces backed by Iran. Turkey has intervened in the 
north, partly claiming that this was a question of preserving its own territorial integrity. Indeed 
the Iraq Study Group recognises this when it suggests that: ‗Other countries in the region fear 
significant violence crossing their borders. Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries to intervene 
to protect their own interests, thereby perhaps sparking a broader regional war‘ (2006: 33; see 
Gordon and Trainor, 2006: 339).
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 Increased tensions between the US and Iran, for a multitude 
of reasons, but in particular accusations by the Americans that Iran is arming Shi‘a militias have 
done little to help the situation in the region (BBC News, 2007). Conversely, elements within 
Saudi Arabia and Syria have been accused by the coalition of aiding Sunni insurgents within 
Iraq, both in terms of the supply of arms and funds. (BBC News, 2006c). For some this suggests 
that Iraq has already become the location for a proxy war between regional powers. 
In order to address these particular concerns, the report of the Iraq Study Group sets out a 
number of key aims. Indeed, its second recommendation, which is the first explicit policy, is that 
‗The goals of the diplomatic offensive as it relates to regional players should be to: i. Support the 
unity and territorial integrity of Iraq‘ (2006: 45). This is explicitly noted in terms of putting 
pressure on Iran and Syria in terms of their actions in the region. The report stresses that ‗Iran 
should stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq, respect Iraq‘s sovereignty and territorial 
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integrity‘ (2006: xv); and that ‗Iran should make clear its support for the territorial integrity of 
Iraq as a unified state, as well as its respect for the sovereignty of Iraq and its government‘ 
(2006: 53). It suggests that the key incentive for these countries is that it will help to create ‗an 
Iraq that does not disintegrate and destabilize its neighbors and the region.‘ (2006: 51). 
Yet the Iraq Study Group‘s call to engage with Iran and Syria may be counter-productive in 
terms of wider US strategy. For concessions from these countries regarding their involvement in 
Iraq is likely to be conditional on US non-intervention in their own domestic affairs. As Dodge 
suggests, ‗the danger is that, if such an understanding is not brokered, and if Iran‘s confrontation 
with the international community continues, Iraq will become an arena in which regional powers 
use violence to further their own foreign-policy aims‘ (Dodge, 2005: 63). 
The report is similarly explicit in suggesting that a division – either into separate states or 
devolved regions – is impracticable and undesirable. 
 
The costs associated with devolving Iraq into three semiautonomous regions with 
loose central control would be too high. Because Iraq‘s population is not neatly 
separated, regional boundaries cannot be easily drawn. All eighteen Iraqi 
provinces have mixed populations, as do Baghdad and most other major cities in 
Iraq. A rapid devolution could result in mass population movements, collapse of 
the Iraqi security forces, strengthening of militias, ethnic cleansing, 
destabilization of neighboring states, or attempts by neighboring states to 
dominate Iraqi regions (Baker and Hamilton, 2006: 39). 
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Thus, for all the supposed tensions between this report and the Bush administration, this is a 
dispute over tactics rather than strategy. Bush declared in a 2007 speech that 
 
Succeeding in Iraq also requires defending its territorial integrity and stabilizing 
the region in the face of extremist challenges. This begins with addressing Iran 
and Syria. These two regimes are allowing terrorists and insurgents to use their 
territory to move in and out of Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks 
on American troops. We will disrupt the attacks on our forces. We'll interrupt the 
flow of support from Iran and Syria. And we will seek out and destroy the 
networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq (Bush, 
2007). 
 
In these terms it is unsurprising that the report states that  
 
We agree with the goal of U.S. policy in Iraq, as stated by the President: an Iraq 
that can ‗govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself.‘ In our view, this definition 
entails an Iraq with a broadly representative government that maintains its 
territorial integrity, is at peace with its neighbors, denies terrorism a sanctuary, 
and doesn‘t brutalize its own people. Given the current situation in Iraq, achieving 
this goal will require much time and will depend primarily on the actions of the 
Iraqi people (2006: 40). 
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Indeed, the much trumpeted ‗troop surge‘, hailed by some as a major success and by others as a 
continual denial of the reality of the situation, simply defers this situation, since it effectively 
delays the shift to the ‗actions of the Iraqi people‘ (see Dodge 2007). Longer term US plans, 
including the establishment of permanent bases and the largest US embassy in the world, and the 
continual meddling with government affairs reinforce this trend. 
 
Conclusions 
This puts us effectively back in 2003. For the US and its allies it is essential that the following 
state of affairs is maintained. Iraq must remain together, but it must demonstrate appropriate 
behaviour in terms of its neighbours and population. Territorial integrity is thus territorial 
preservation; unity; and the only possibly viability considered and supported is of the entire state. 
Yet its sovereignty must remain entirely contingent, for three key reasons. These are exactly the 
same as the reasons for invasion, and the broader arguments made for the contingency of 
territorial sovereignty: the stability of the region, including weapons of mass destruction; the 
harbouring of terrorists; and the treatment of its people. While the latter is the basis of 
‗humanitarian intervention‘, recoded as the ‗responsibility to protect‘; the first two are the key 
aims of the ‗global war on terror‘. 
We thus have a renewed reinforcement of the breaking apart of territorial integrity – preservation 
of territorial extent but contingency of sovereignty within it. The viability of this remains off the 
official agenda, even as realities on the ground make the idea of a unified Iraqi state and territory 
an increasingly apparent fiction. Can the two halves of territorial integrity be put back together or 
is the split irrevocable? If territorial sovereignty is held to be contingent, can challenges to 
territorial preservation be continually deferred? To put this way, why should the actions of a state 
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be limited when the spatial extent of that power is precisely unquestioned? These issues of 
course exceed the particular case examined here, and are deeply worrying for many in the 
international community, but the relation between Iraq and the international community throws a 
number of these issues into stark focus. In terms of Iraq it is difficult to disagree with Galbraith‘s 
judgement that the constitution and the effective ‗three-state solution‘ that it implicitly tends 
toward ‗could lead to the country‘s dissolution‘. He suggests that if it does, ‗there will be no 
reason to mourn Iraq‘s passing‘ (Galbraith, 2006: 206). The question, of course, is what cost will 
be incurred by the disintegration of its territorial integrity: invoked, violated, and increasingly 
unviable. 
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Notes 
 
1
  For a representative sampling of the literature see Gottmann 1973; Sack 1986; Storey 
2001; Delaney 2005; Elden 2009. 
2
  This paper makes use of a number of semi-structured interviews conducted by the authors 
with several British politicians, current and former diplomats (both British and Iraqi), and 
a British newspaper commentator. These interviewees were chosen either because of their 
knowledge of the situation in Iraq, or because of their views on it. The interviews were 
completed over a two-month period during the winter of 2006-07 in London. This 
methodological approach was adopted to enable analysis to be conducted of how these 
informed actors understood the notion of territorial integrity as it was being applied by 
themselves and their peers to Iraq. It should be noted that other key actors—notably 
serving government ministers—were unwilling to be interviewed. 
3
  Interview with Sir Jeremy Greenstock (former UK Ambassador to the UN and Her 
Majesty‘s former Special Representative in Iraq), conducted by Author A, 5th December 
2006; Interview with Clare Short MP (former Secretary of State for International 
Development and Cabinet member), conducted by Author A, 5
th
 December 2006.  
4
  The reference to Kuwait in these resolutions is in part an attempt to tie this crisis back to 
the 1990-91 invasion of Kuwait, which began the long war against Iraq. For some, the 
authority to invade was provided by resolution 688, a case which is known as the ‗revival 
argument‘. Greenstock forcefully made this point in his interview with us. 
5
  Interview with Simon Jenkins (British journalist at the Guardian newspaper), conducted 
by Author A, 6
th
 December 2006. 
6
  Interview with Greenstock. 
7
  For a fuller discussion, see Elden 2008. 
8
  The territory that the British ruled was composed of three vilayets – Baghdad, Basra, and 
Mosul – which had been part of the Ottoman Empire. The British Army invaded Basra 
and moved north to Baghdad during the First World War, first to drive out the Ottomans 
and second to access the oil reserves around Basra (Sluglett, 1976). In 1916 the UK and 
France signed the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement to carve up the former Ottoman 
territories in the Middle East (The Geographer, 1970). At the end of the First World War 
the Treaty of Sèvres was negotiated between the Ottoman government and the allies to 
delimit Turkey‘s borders. Although never ratified due to the Turkish war of independence 
it stipulated that the Turkish–Iraqi border should follow the northern border of Mosul 
vilayet (The Geographer, 1964). Two years later the League of Nations granted control of 
Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul to the UK, with France gaining control of Syria, and the state 
of Iraq was born. Its borders were still to be officially settled, especially those delimiting 
the boundary with Turkey. The presence of Kurds in Turkey, Iraq and neighbouring 
countries was problematic, and even though the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne set out plans 
for the settlement of the Iraq-Turkey boundary within nine months of its ratification this 
never occurred. The border was finally settled by the Council of the League of Nations is 
October 1924. They adopted the ‗Brussels Line‘ which delimited the boundary along the 
Mosul vilayet‘s boundary (The Geographer, 1964). 
9
  Interview with Jenkins. 
10
  Interview with Michael Moore MP (Liberal Democrat Foreign Affairs spokesman), 
conducted by Author B, 30
th
 January 2007. 
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11
  Interview with Iraqi Ambassador to UK, Dr Salah al Shaikly, conducted by Author A, 4
th
 
December 2006. 
12
  Interview with Greenstock. 
13
  Interview with al Shaikly. 
14
  Interview with al Shaikly. 
15
  This was a point that was repeatedly made in the interviews, particularly by Labour MP, 
John McDonnell (conducted by Author A, 4
th
 December 2006) and Plaid Cymru MP, 
Adam Price (conducted with Author B, 30
th
 January 2007). 
16
  The Iraqi Ambassador disputed this in his interview with us. The recent US troop surge 
 can be seen as an acknowledgment that this labelling is not without some validity. 
17
  Interview with al Shaikly. 
18
  This opinion was also voiced by Keith Simpson MP (Conservative Foreign Affairs 
spokesman for Middle East affairs) in an interview with Author B, 30
th
 January 2007 
19
  Interview with al Shaikly. 
20
  See Anderson and Stansfield 2004 for an analysis of the complex, geographically 
overlapping, nature of the ethnic and religious composition of Iraq. Interestingly most of 
our interviewees reinforced this notion, talking about the Sunni Triangle, the Kurdish 
north, and referencing Iraq‘s geography by its ethnic groups. 
21
  A view reinforced by Simpson. 
22
  Interview with Greenstock. 
23
  Interview with Greenstock. Similar points were made in the interview with Jenkins. 
24
  Interview with Short; interview with Jenkins. 
25
  Interview with al Shaikly. 
26
  Interview with Jenkins. 
27
  Especially noted by Simpson. 
28
  Price suggested that such a conference would be significant, both in terms of dealing with 
Iraq, but also to start moving towards solutions for conflicts right across the Middle East. 
29
  This is generally made by the US and UK administrations, and stressed in the interview 
with Greenstock. 
30
  As well as many media reports, this point was made to us by al Shaikly. 
31
  This is a point about the US putting pressure on the Kurds not to push toward Kirkuk and 
give Turkey a casus belli.  
